It is widely believed that international cooperation can arise through strategies of reciprocity. In this paper, we investigate whether citizens in the United States and twenty-five other countries support reciprocity to deal with climate change. We find little public enthusiasm for intrinsic reciprocity, in which countries restrain their consumption of fossil fuels if and only if other countries do the same. In contrast, we find significant support for extrinsic reciprocity, in which countries enforce cooperation by linking issues. Citizens support economic sanctions against polluters and are willing to shame them in international forums, especially when the polluters are violating a treaty. Cooperation could, therefore, emerge from efforts to link climate with other issues and to embed climate commitments in international law.
INTRODUCTION
How can countries cooperate in the absence of a central authority? The seminal work of Axelrod (1984) and Keohane (1984) argued that countries can sustain cooperation by employing strategies of reciprocity, in which each country restrains its pursuit of self-interest if other countries do the same. We extend this line of research by investigating whether ordinary citizens support strategies of reciprocity.
We examine this topic with reference to climate change for both practical and theoretical reasons. Concerns about climate change are mounting, and many now regard it as the major challenge confronting the international community. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has concluded that the earth is warming and attributes most of the trend to human activities-especially the consumption of fossil fuels. The panel predicts that global warming will trigger widespread flooding of coastal regions, extreme weather such as droughts and hurricanes, and the disruption of food supplies. It is important to know what measures, if any, citizens would be willing to take to address this impending challenge.
We focus on public attitudes toward reciprocity because reciprocity is a central theme in international negotiations about climate change. Leaders understand that any solution will require international cooperation: to stabilize the level of carbon in the atmosphere, countries around the world will need to curtail their consumption of fossil fuels. Leaders also recognize that transitioning from fossil fuels will require major sacrifices. Many have, therefore, insisted on burden sharing. In a series of talks sponsored by the United Nations, the major emitters of carbon-the United States, the European Union, Japan, China, India, and others-have offered to reduce their emissions substantially if and only if other nations take commensurate action. Our study reveals whether citizens insist on the kinds of reciprocal commitments that leaders have been demanding in international forums.
Our research also speaks to a scholarly debate about whether strategies of reciprocity are appropriate and credible ways to address environmental problems. We distinguish two forms of reciprocity that countries could employ to enforce cooperation on climate change. The first, intrinsic reciprocity, involves adjusting one's effort to reflect the efforts of others (Lipson, 1981) .
Countries that use this strategy will restrain their emissions insofar as other nations show similar restraint, but will not make sacrifices if other nations prove unwilling to do their part. The second strategy, extrinsic reciprocity, involves linking cooperation in one domain of international relations to cooperation on others (Lohmann, 1997) . Countries that use this strategy might offer carrots such as trade and aid to nations that reduce greenhouse emissions, while slapping sanctions on nations that refuse to help.
Both forms of reciprocity are vulnerable to problems of credibility. A strategy is credible if self-interested players would carry it out, but it is not clear whether countries would actually punish other nations for polluting. Suppose, for example, that many nations agreed to reduce their consumption of fossil fuels, but then some cheated on the agreement. The remaining parties to the agreement could respond by reducing their own abatement efforts and/or imposing extrinsic sanctions on the cheaters. As Barrett (2012) and others have emphasized, though, countries might not be willing to carry out these punitive steps. In democracies, the credibility of punishments depends not only on the preferences of leaders but also on the views of their constituents. We shed light on this issue of credibility by investigating how citizens react when other countries shirk.
Our paper systematically analyzes public support for reciprocity on climate change. Data from twenty-six countries reveal little enthusiasm for intrinsic reciprocity. Most citizens believe that the amount of effort they exert at home should not depend on levels of environmentalism abroad. This fact undermines the credibility of strategies in which each country restrains its emissions only so long as other countries restrain theirs. However, we find substantial support for extrinsic reciprocity. Many citizens are willing to apply economic sanctions against polluters and shame them in international forums, especially when the polluter is violating a treaty.
Cooperation could, therefore, emerge from efforts to link climate policy with other issues-for instance, trade-and embed states' commitments in international law.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND PUBLIC OPINION
The nature of the problem: International cooperation on climate change has been difficult because climate change is "the ultimate global commons problem" (Stavins, 2011b) . To reduce greenhouse gas emissions, countries will need to make substantial sacrifices. Their residents will need to drive smaller cars, adjust their thermostats, take shorter showers, and carpool or rely on public transportation. Countries will also need to make large investments in alternative energy technologies such as solar panels, wind farms, and nuclear plants. Each of these actions entails high costs, but the benefits of acting are non-excludable: countries that refuse to make sacrifices will nonetheless benefit from the efforts of others. Robert Stavins (2011a, p. 49) estimates that, "For virtually any jurisdiction, the benefits it reaps from its climate-policy actions will be less than the costs it incurs." Hence, each country has strong incentives to free ride on the sacrifices of others.
Given the temptation to free ride, how can cooperation be achieved without a centralized enforcement authority? Many analysts argue that countries can enforce cooperation by using conditional strategies that reward good behavior and penalize bad behavior. If the rewards and punishments are substantial enough, conditional strategies could incentivize all countries to contribute to the common good. Charles Lipson (1981) usefully distinguished between two types of conditional strategies: intrinsic strategies, in which actions and reactions occur within a single policy realm; and extrinsic strategies, in which behavior on one issue prompts responses on others (see also Keohane (1986) ). Both types could promote cooperation, but it is not obvious whether citizens would support them.
Intrinsic reciprocity and the mass public: Many authors have argued that intrinsic strategies can sustain international cooperation (Axelrod, 1984; Barrett, 1990; Grundig, 2006; Jørgensen, Martín-Herrán, & Zaccour, 2010; Keohane, 1984) . The most familiar intrinsic strategy, tit for tat, requires each player to imitate opponents by matching cooperation with equivalent cooperation and countering defection with equivalent defection. Although intrinsic strategies such as tit for tat are employed most often in bilateral relations, they can be adapted to deal with multilateral problems. On the issue of climate policy, for example, countries could agree to restrain their emissions if and only if other countries do the same.
As Hugh Ward (1996, p. 856) explains, "The key to stable, cooperative collective action when binding agreements are impossible is typically that players' cooperation is conditional on the past cooperation of others. If one side fails to cooperate, this triggers retaliation in the form of refusal to continue to cooperate. For instance the European Union (EU) might press ahead with making cuts to its emissions so long as the other major northern economies were doing the same; but if they failed to cooperate in this way, the EU could switch strategy, scrapping its plans to make further cuts or even allowing emissions to increase." Provided that players have sufficiently long time horizons, international cooperation could be sustained by the fear that defection by some countries would trigger defection by others, leading to the destruction of the global commons.
The negative reaction could take various forms. Governments could, for example, respond to foreign pollution by relaxing domestic regulations on individuals and businesses; by cutting subsidies for green consumption and production; or by refraining from new investments in alternative sources of energy. At the same time, citizens could reduce their personal efforts to combat global warming. They might reset their thermostats to more comfortable levels, drive to work instead of taking public transportation, and avoid paying for green technologies that are good for the environment but bad for the pocketbook.
Admittedly, countries may not have complete flexibility to retaliate against foreign pollution. Past policies could create inertia. Suppose, for example, that the United States reduces its emissions by switching from coal to solar power. If foreigners continued to burn fossil fuel, it seems unlikely that the United States would dismantle its solar grid and revert to coal. The U.S. government could, however, decide to meet future electrical demand by bringing coal plants back online or by directing future investments toward coal instead of solar. Moreover, even if the United States committed irrevocably to solar, it could still respond to foreign pollution by allowing higher emissions in other parts of the U.S. economy. Because "virtually every human activity directly or indirectly involves the combustion of fossil fuels" (Nordhaus, 2011, p. 10) , countries have many opportunities to adjust domestic emissions in response to foreign ones.
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When responding to foreign cheating, leaders may worry about the potential for collateral damage. If a country reacted by cutting its own green initiatives, this step could impose negative externalities not only on cheaters but also on cooperative countries. Retaliation could even hurt the retaliator by exacerbating global warming and polluting the local environment. These points do not, by themselves, imply that intrinsic reciprocity lacks credibility. When other countries cheat, it may be rational to follow suit instead of accepting the sucker's payoff. Nonetheless, countries may prefer extrinsic punishments, such as diplomatic pressure and trade sanctions, which can be applied directly against cheaters while minimizing collateral damage.
In light of these arguments, how would citizens respond to the climate policies of foreign countries? We distinguish and test for three potential responses: emulation, counterbalancing, and non-reaction.
The first possibility is emulation, i.e., controlling emissions if other countries control emissions, but abandoning restraint if other countries abandon restraint. Emulation could arise from a strategic effort to enforce cooperation by employing multilateral trigger strategies.
Emulation could also stem from the ethical conviction that free riding is immoral, and that it would be morally acceptable to shirk if other countries shirked. Either logic could cause public support for climate policies to rise and fall in response to the actions of other countries.
A second possibility is that citizens might choose to counterbalance, rather than emulate.
After learning about major foreign efforts to stop global warming, citizens might conclude that their own country's contributions are no longer necessary and that their country can pollute freely without jeopardizing the global commons. Conversely, after hearing that other countries are increasing emissions, citizens might redouble their own efforts in order to offset the destructive activities of foreigners. By this logic, foreign pollution could mobilize citizens to support environmental policies, whereas foreign environmentalism could demobilize them.
Counterbalancing could also emerge as a rational response to changes in the international economy. If some countries slash their consumption of fossil fuels, the global price of fossil fuels will fall. Consumers in other countries might respond to lower prices by purchasing and burning more fossil fuels, thereby undermining the original coalition's efforts to combat global warming.
A parallel effect could arise due to changes in international trade. "Since a carbon abatement policy by cooperating countries may shift comparative advantage in carbon-intensive goods toward non-cooperating countries, production of such goods and emissions may rise outside the coalition" (Stavins, 1997, p. 318) . To the extent that citizens counterbalance rather than emulate foreign countries, the prospects for international cooperation on climate change will be poor.
Finally, citizens might not have any intrinsic (within-issue) reaction to the policies of other countries. Some citizens might endorse national environmental legislation and make personal efforts to reduce their own emissions, even if foreigners do not contribute to the global cause. Other citizens might refuse to act, even if other countries aggressively control their own carbon emissions. We use the terms "unconditional" and "noncontingent" to describe policy preferences that do not depend on the behavior of other countries.
To summarize, international relations scholars argue that cooperation could arise via intrinsic reciprocity. By definition, this form of reciprocity requires countries to emulate each other. If, however, citizens-and the governments that serve them-have unconditional or counterbalancing preferences, reciprocity will not occur. It is, therefore, important to investigate how citizens would respond intrinsically to the climate policies of other countries. We expect that most countries have mixed populations, 2 in which some people want to emulate foreign behavior, others want to counterbalance foreign behavior, and still others have unconditional policy preferences. Below, we test for all three types and estimate the relative frequency of each.
Extrinsic reciprocity and the mass public: A second way to enforce international cooperation is via extrinsic reciprocity. Rather than treating issues discretely, countries could make cooperation in one sphere contingent on cooperation in another (Lohmann, 1997) . For instance, countries could apply trade sanctions against nations that emit high levels of carbon (Barrett, 1997 (Barrett, , 2003 Esty, 2001; Stiglitz, 2006) . They could also invoke diplomatic sanctions, reduce foreign aid, or shame polluters in international bodies such as the United Nations. The crucial point is that extrinsic reciprocity operates across issue areas, not within them.
Linkage strategies will succeed only insofar as the linkages are credible. Consequently, we investigate public support for extrinsic rewards and punishments. We expect extrinsic reciprocity to be popular, but think the public will prefer cheap measures such as diplomatic pressure over more expensive measures such as trade embargoes and military intervention.
Finally, we hypothesize that international institutions will shape public support for conditional strategies. International institutions (defined broadly to include not only formal organizations but also legal agreements and informal norms) can promote cooperation by establishing standards of behavior, monitoring the activities of countries, exposing countries that cheat, and suggesting appropriate punishments or inducements. But institutions can serve an additional function that has not received sufficient attention in the international relations literature. Treaties, we argue, can make conditional strategies more credible by strengthening public support for retaliation against nations that fail to cooperate. Other factors equal, we predict that the public will be more willing to apply sanctions against a country when that country's pollution violates a treaty, than when its pollution does not. Costly versus Costless Action: One might also wonder whether respondents voiced environmental preferences because they assumed that action would be costless. To check this possibility, we split the World Bank sample into two groups: those who predicted that it would be "necessary to increase the cost of energy, to encourage individuals and businesses to conserve more or to use alternative forms of energy" (60%), and those who did not expect that action would require higher energy prices (40%). In every country, support for unconditional action was at least as high among people who anticipated higher energy prices as among people who did not.
EVIDENCE FROM CROSS-NATIONAL SURVEYS
Other studies reinforce this conclusion. Li et al. (2004) measured U.S. support for two types of climate agreements: a narrow agreement that demanded sacrifices from developed countries, and a wider agreement that also required developing countries to cut emissions. Each respondent read that the agreement "would cost your household t dollars per year in increased energy and gasoline prices," where t was randomly drawn from a list of nine values ranging from $6 to $2,400. Respondents were further cautioned, "Keep in mind that dollars spent on increased energy and gasoline prices could not be spent on other things, such as other household expenses, charities, groceries or car payments" (p. 333). We reanalyzed their data and found no evidence that costs affected the preference for a wide agreement over a narrow one.
Similarly, Bechtel and Scheve (2013) measured public support for hypothetical climate agreements that varied not only in the cost per household but also in the number of participating countries. Adults in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States preferred agreements that encompassed many countries over agreements that involved relatively few countries. When we reanalyzed their data, though, we found no correlation between the desire for broad participation and the stipulated cost per household. Citizens preferred the broad agreement by roughly the same margin, regardless of how much the agreement would cost them personally.
DETAILED EVIDENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES
We now deepen the analysis by examining four additional questions. should not act at all. The remainder demanded sacrifices from other industrial countries (4%) or from both the industrial and the developing world (9%). Thus, unconditional preferences predominated even when the questions mentioned specific countries at different stages of development.
[ The top left panel of Figure 1 , which displays the average reactions of all respondents, supports two conclusions. First, Americans responded positively to foreign conservation. When most countries in the world were maintaining the status quo the average environmental score among U.S. respondents was 53. But when other countries curtailed their fossil fuel consumption by a small amount, U.S. environmentalism jumped to 64, and when foreigners curtailed their consumption by a large amount, the U.S. index climbed above 70. These changes in U.S.
environmentalism were substantively large and almost certainly did not arise by chance alone.
[ Figure 1 about here] Second, Americans did not respond negatively to foreign pollution. The average environmental score among U.S. respondents was just as high when foreigners increased consumption of fossil fuels, as when foreigners maintained the status quo. The same conclusions held when we subdivided the sample into Democrats, Independents, and Republicans (remaining panels of Figure 1 ). In summary, U.S. reactions were asymmetric: Americans were willing to undertake reciprocal reductions, but they not willing to engage in reciprocal shirking.
This asymmetry surprised us. We expected that American environmentalism would waver if other countries consumed more fossil fuels. The asymmetry was also at odds with recent studies about how citizens respond to information about energy consumption by their neighbors.
In one study, Schultz et al. (2007) provided homeowners with data about the average energy use of other homes in the neighborhood. High-consuming households responded by conserving energy but low-consuming households started using more energy, a phenomenon psychologists call the "boomerang" effect. 8 Fischer (2008) reviewed twelve additional experiments and found that informing people about the actions of neighbors had no net effect on consumption. The reason, Fisher speculated, is that social information "stimulates high users to conserve" but encourages low users to "upgrade a little." We found no boomerang effect. Even after hearing that most countries were increasing emissions, Americans did not retreat from their environmental stances.
There are several potential explanations for the asymmetry. Perhaps some Americans were not currently sacrificing, and therefore had no flexibility to respond to foreign pollution by reducing their own sacrifices. Other Americans might have been reluctant to burn more fossil fuels, because they were worried about smog and other local environmental pollutants. Still others might have maintained restraint because higher energy consumption would hurt future generations. Finally, some Americans might have preferred issue linkage, discussed below, over intrinsic reciprocity.
Analysis at the Individual Level:
To better understand why Americans responded asymmetrically to foreign pollution, we analyzed the reactions of each individual (Table 3) .
Three patterns emerged.
[ Table 3 [ Table 4 about here] Table 4 shows the percentage of people who exhibited each pattern. More than half had reliably unconditional preferences, approximately 23% were consistent emulators, and 5% were consistent counterbalancers. We were particularly intrigued by counterbalancers and asked them to explain their preferences in a few sentences. Many cited the need to compensate for bad behavior by other countries, or the opportunity to free ride without destroying the environment.
As one respondent wrote:
If other countries increase their use of fuels by a large amount, the U.S.A. should decrease by a large amount to offset the increase in other countries. But if other countries decrease by a large amount … it would take the burden off citizens of the U.S.A. to decrease by a lot.
A few people provided a different rationale, which invoked the laws of supply and demand.
According to one sophisticated respondent:
In the situation wherein most countries increase their use of fossil fuels, the equilibrium price of fossil fuels in general would go up. Therefore the U.S. should use less, being as what the U.S. should use is dependent upon the laws of supply and demand. Conversely, if most countries decrease their use of fossil fuels, the equilibrium price of fossil fuels would go down. Therefore the U.S. should use more, in accordance with those same laws.
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Finally, around 17% of the sample had non-monotonic preferences. More than half of these non-monotonic patterns were U-shaped, such as (100, 50, 50, 50, 100). Perhaps people with U-shaped preferences had mixed motives: they wanted to reciprocate when other countries improved upon the status quo but sought to compensate when other nations fell short. Future analysis could reveal why some respondents expressed non-monotonic preferences.
When we subdivided the sample by political party (rightmost columns of table 4), the patterns were similar. Two additional findings about partisanship deserve mention. First, contrary to the conventional stereotype, Republicans were not more likely to go it alone.
Unconditional preferences were as prevalent among Democrats and Independents as among Republicans, and emulation was actually most common among Republicans. Second, although all three groups had similar rates of unilateralism, the content of their unilateralism differed.
About five-sixths of the Democrats with unconditional preferences wanted to decrease consumption by a large amount. In contrast, Republicans exhibited a wide range of unconditional positions, with a plurality wanting to keep U.S. consumption at present levels.
Public Support for Issue Linkage: Finally, we compared support for intrinsic versus extrinsic reciprocity. Half of our Mechanical Turk subjects considered the following scenario: "Five years ago, a country said that it would reduce its use of fossil fuels and work with the U.S. and other nations on the problem of global warming. In the past five years, the country has increased its use of fossil fuels by a large amount and it is refusing all efforts to reduce the use of fossil fuels.
The country is now encouraging businesses to drill for more fossil fuels. Experts think that the country's use of fossil fuels will double over the next twenty years. The country has high levels of trade with the U.S." 10 The other half of our respondents received the same scenario, but we replaced the phrase "the country said that it would reduce its use of fossil fuels" with the phrase "the country signed a treaty, in which it promised under international law that it would reduce its use of fossil fuels."
After presenting the scenario we listed several ways the United States could respond and asked respondents to "check all actions that you think the U.S. should take in this situation." The options were: not take any action in this situation; increase U.S. use of fossil fuels; criticize the other country publicly; cut off trade with the country; take military action against the country; or take some other action. Participants who selected "some other action" were invited to describe it. Table 5 shows how Americans responded. Once again, we found little willingness to match shirking with shirking. When the country had not signed a treaty, only 3% thought the United States should respond by using more fossil fuels, and 7% volunteered that the United
States should start using less.
[ In sum, Americans may not support intrinsic strategies, but most are willing to use extrinsic ones. The vast majority favor carrots such as foreign aid, sticks such as public humiliation and trade sanctions, or the method of quiet diplomacy. They regard extrinsic sanctions as more appropriate and effective than in-kind retaliation.
Finally, table 5 confirms our hypothesis that treaties boost public support for several types of punishments. Around 51% wanted to sever trade with a polluter who was violating a treaty, but only 37% endorsed that response when an otherwise equivalent country had not signed a treaty. Likewise, 59% wanted to criticize the polluter publicly when it had previously signed a treaty, whereas only 48% favored public criticism when the country had made a purely verbal commitment. Thus, the treaty caused a 14-point surge in public support for trade sanctions and an 11-point jump in public support for naming and shaming. Interestingly, the treaty did not affect support for intrinsic responses, military intervention, foreign aid, or quiet diplomacy.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigated support for conditional cooperation on the issue of climate change. Using surveys from twenty-six countries, we found that most people have unconditional Analysis is based on 375 cases in which the country signed a treaty, and 333 cases in which the country did not sign a treaty. The last column, labeled difference, gives the effect of the treaty; 95% confidence intervals appear in parentheses.
U.S. should Yes No
Selected options: Criticize the country publicly 59 48 11 (4 to 19) Cut off trade with the country 51 37 14 (7 to 21) Take military action against the country 3 2 1 (-2 to 3) Increase its own use of fossil fuels 2 3 0 (-3 to 2) Not take any action in this situation 11 19 -7 (-12 to -2) Volunteered options: Decrease its own use of fossil fuels 6 7 -1 (-5 to 3) Help the country decrease its use 7 8 -1 (-5 to 3) Engage in private diplomatic talks 19 22 -3 (-9 to 3) Refer the problem to the U.N. Note: The figure shows the average environmental score among U.S. respondents, conditional on whether other countries increased, maintained, or decreased their use of fossil fuels. The dots represent the means, and the horizontal lines are 95% confidence intervals. Each estimate is based on a sample of 708 respondents, consisting of 374 for Democrats, 158 independents, and 176 for Republicans. 1 One interesting nuance is whether countries that make early investments to combat climate change, e.g., by shifting parts of the economy to low-carbon technologies, might be vulnerable to exploitation by other countries in the future. The concern could be mitigated by employing trustbuilding gestures (Kydd, 2005) ; by phasing in environmental policies gradually; or by making national policy conditional on costly and potentially irreversible investments by foreign countries.
2 "Some countries have sufficiently strong environmental constituencies that they will reduce greenhouse gas emissions regardless of FCCC requirements or the actions of other states. These "unilateral compliers" will be joined by some "contingent compliers", who will comply once they are assured that enough others will comply….Despite compliance by some actors, many are likely to violate regime rules" (Mitchell, 2001, p. 231) . 8 Researchers have also studied ways to counteract the boomerang effect, e.g., by suggesting that low consumption is morally desirable, or by providing all households with energy conservation tips. See Schultz et al. (2007) and Alcott (2011). 9 We hypothesized three potential motives for counterbalancing: benign (compensating for bad behavior by other countries), malign (exploiting the opportunity to free ride without destroying the environment), and market-based (responding to changes in the world economy, such as declines in the price of fossil fuels or shifts in the pattern of comparative advantage). The openended responses to our survey were not detailed enough to reveal how many of these motives counterbalancers had in mind. Future research could use closed-ended questions to measure the prevalence of each motive.
